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Causation in Tort: General Populations vs. Individual Cases 
 
William Meadow
* and Cass R. Sunstein
** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  To establish causation, a tort plaintiff must show that it is “more 
probable than not” that the harm would not have occurred if the defendant 
had followed the relevant standard of care. Statistical evidence, based on 
aggregate data, is sometimes introduced to show that the defendant’s 
conduct created a statistically significant increase in the likelihood that the 
harm would occur. But there is a serious problem with the use of such 
evidence: It does not establish that in the particular case, the injury was 
more likely than not to have occurred because the defendant behaved 
negligently. Under existing doctrine, a plaintiff should not be able to 
establish liability on the basis of a showing of a statistically significant 
increase in risk. This point has general implications for the use of 
statistical evidence in tort cases. It also raises complex issues about the 
relationship between individual cases and general deterrence: Optimal 
deterrence might be obtained by imposing liability on defendants who 
engage in certain behavior, even though a failure to engage in such 
behavior cannot be connected with the plaintiff’s harm by reference to the 
ordinary standards of causation. 
 
 
I. The Thesis 
 
Our goal in this brief essay is to establish a simple point about causation. In tort 
cases, a plaintiff sometimes seeks to establish causation by establishing an increase in the 
statistical risk faced by a group of people who are similarly situated to the plaintiff. But a 
statistical increase in risk, for the relevant group, does not demonstrate causation in the 
legally relevant sense; such an increase fails to show that it is more likely than not that 
the particular plaintiff’s injury was caused by the particular defendant’s conduct. We 
focus here on malpractice cases, but the point holds for tort cases in general. 
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II. The Basic Problem 
 
To see the basic problem, consider this hypothetical case: 
 
  A woman was admitted to an obstetric service in the early stages of labor at 28 
weeks gestation. At the time of her admission, her fetus was estimated to weigh two 
pounds. The likelihood that a baby born at that gestation would develop respiratory 
distress syndrome of prematurity (RDS) after birth was approximately 40%. There had 
been reports in the medical literature for more than three decades that administration of 
antenatal cortico-steroids (ACS) would significantly reduce the incidence of RDS after 
birth to approximately 28%.
1 However, concerns about possible side-effects of ACS also 
existed. Some obstetricians routinely gave ACS to women threatening premature 
delivery; others did not. This woman did not receive ACS. 
  The woman delivered her baby at 28 weeks gestation. The baby weighed two 
pounds. The baby was sick with RDS and died. The obstetrician was sued for 
malpractice. The plaintiff claimed that the obstetrician violated the standard of care by 
not providing ACS, and that the failure to provide ACS caused or contributed to the 
child’s death.  
Two kinds of expert witnesses were called by the plaintiff and defense lawyers: 
obstetricians discussing the standard of care and neonatologists discussing causation. We 
focus here on the latter question.
2 How should the legal system resolve the causation 
problem, which typically requires the plaintiff to establish that it was more probable than 
not that the failure to administer ACS “caused” RDS in this infant? To approach this 
problem, is it important to separate two different questions. (1) Does maternal ACS 
reduce the risk of RDS in the population of premature babies? (2) Is it more probable 
than not that not giving ACS to the mother caused RDS in this baby? For legal purposes, 
the second question is the relevant one, though it is easy to conflate it with the first. The 
answer to the first question calls for application of the concept of risk reduction within 
large groups. The answer to the second question requires exploration of risk reduction for 
particular infants, which is a different concept altogether. 
                                                 
1 Antenatal corticosteroids for accelerating fetal lung maturation for women at risk of preterm birth Roberts 
D, Dalziel S http://www.cochrane.org/reviews/en/ab004454.html accessed Sept. 12, 2007. 
2 On standard of care issues, see William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 Duke 
LJ 629 (2001) 3 
The plaintiff’s neonatology expert testified that to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, the baby’s RDS was caused by not giving ACS to the mother. His reasoning 
was straightforward. He examined data (or more precisely, examined published articles 
and published meta-analyses of these articles) describing randomized trials of two groups 
of pregnant women with threatened premature delivery, matched for relevant potential 
confounding variables (gestational age; gender; race; etc). One group of pregnant women 
received ACS; the other group did not. The relevant articles described the incidence of 
RDS in the babies born of these two groups of women. It turns out that roughly 40% of 
babies born at 28 weeks gestation will get RDS if their mother did not receive ACS, 
compared to only 28% of babies born at this gestation who will get RDS if their mother 
did receive ACS. Statistically, one would need about 150 mothers in each group to 
demonstrate a statistically significant (at the p<0.05 level) difference between an infant 
RDS incidence of 40% and 28%.   
This is not an especially large clinical study; there are many larger ones in the 
literature. Meta-analyses have assessed the outcomes of roughly 35,000 infants who were 
enrolled in randomized clinical trials where maternal ACS was an analyzed risk factor 
and infant RDS was an outcome variable. The plaintiff’s expert cited them all.  ACS 
reduces the incidence of RDS in 28-week gestation babies with a certainty of more than 
9,999 in 10,000 (a p value of < 0.0001). Clearly, he reasoned, to a reasonable degree of 
certainty the failure to give the mother ACS "caused or contributed to" RDS in her baby. 
But the defense expert made a different calculation. The question at issue, she 
argued, is not whether ACS reduces the incidence of RDS in a population of 28-week 
gestation infants—the question at hand is whether the lack of ACS caused RDS in this 
particular baby.  She acknowledge that in babies born at this gestation ACS reduces the 
likelihood of RDS from 40% to 28%, and that this reduction is statistically significant 
(she could hardly have done otherwise). But she also pointed out the implications of the 
size of this risk reduction. For every 100 women who delivered at 28 weeks and did not 
receive ACS, 40 babies would get RDS. But for every 100 women who delivered at 28 
weeks and did receive ACS, 28 babies would still have gotten RDS (that is the size of the 
absolute risk reduction within large populations, from 40% to 28%). Therefore, only 12 
of every 40 untreated babies could attribute their RDS to lack of ACS, and 28 of every 40 
could not. In short, for any individual baby the probability of attributing RDS to a lack of 4 
ACS (the relative risk reduction) is 12/40 = 30%. That number falls far short of 50.1% 
probability, which is required by the “more probable than not” standard. 
The confusion, in short, is between a statistically significant absolute risk 
reduction across large groups and a relative risk reduction for individuals. This confusion 
arises in many tort cases. In some cases, of course, causation can be shown in both 
senses. Consider an example, quite familiar to pediatricians, and arguably the greatest 
medical advance in the last half-century—vaccinations. Since the mid-1950s, polio, 
diphtheria, whooping cough, mumps, measles, German measles, pneumococcal 
pneumonia, and Hemophilus meningitis have all virtually disappeared as public health 
concerns in the United States—because giving vaccines to children immunizes them 
against acquiring these diseases. Imagine a medical practitioner who chose not to give his 
patients vaccines (analogous to our test case of an obstetrician who chose not give ACS). 
And imagine further that one of his patients caught one of these preventable diseases, and 
sued. How do data bear on this claim?  Was this child’s illness more probably than not a 
result of not having been immunized?  
As one example, consider invasive Hemophilus influenzae (H. flu) disease (a 
blood stream infection or meningitis caused by the bacterium H. flu). For children under 
four years of age, the rate of acquiring invasive H. flu disease in the era before H. flu 
vaccine was roughly 1/1000 children per year (20,000 cases / 16 million children under 4 
years old in the U.S.). After H. flu vaccine was introduced, the rate was reduced by 
almost a factor of 100 to approximately 1/100,000 children, or 300 cases per year.
3 The 
math is quite straightforward. Consider a hypothetical group of 100,000 children under 
the age of four years, all of whom did not get the vaccine. One hundred of these children 
would be expected to get meningitis (1/1,000 * 100,000). Now consider a group of 
100,000 children of the same age who did get the vaccine—only one of them would still 
have gotten meningitis (that is the size of the absolute risk reduction, from 100/100,000 
to 1/100,000). Therefore, 99 of every 100 of unvaccinated children who acquired 
meningitis could attribute their meningitis to non-vaccination (the relative risk reduction 
is 99%). That is much more probably true than not. Hence causation, in the legally 
                                                 
3Haemophilus influenzae Invasive Disease in the United States, 1994–1995: Near Disappearance of a 
Vaccine-Preventable Childhood Disease; Kristine M. Bisgard, Annie Kao, John Leake, Peter M. Strebel, 
Bradley A. Perkins, and Melinda Wharton _Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, 
USA http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol4no2/bisgard.htm accessed Sept. 12, 2007 5 
relevant sense, has been established. 
III. Toxic Exposures and Related Problems 
 
The same analysis applies in the inverse situation—that is, the risk of toxic 
exposure, whether to an environmental toxin, or a drug. Such situations also arise in the 
tort system with some frequency. In these cases, we must consider the arithmetic 
involved in the risk of exposure vs. benefit of non-exposure (as opposed to our previous 
example, where we balanced the potential benefit of exposure to the risk of non-
exposure). It turns out that these situations are analytically identical. In the context of 
medical malpractice, consider, as an example familiar to pediatricians (or at least older 
pediatricians), the potential relationship between exposure to the antibiotic 
chloramphenicol and the development of a complication, aplastic anemia—a potentially 
fatal disease where the bone marrow stops producing red blood cells.  
Imagine that a pediatrician prescribed chloramphenicol to a child with a serious 
infection. The child recovered from the infection, but developed aplastic anemia, and 
sued, claiming that the aplastic anemia was caused, more probably than not, by 
chloramphenicol. How would we know? 
First, is there any causal relationship between chloramphenicol and aplastic 
anemia? The actual data for chloramphenicol exposure and aplastic anemia go something 
like this. The incidence of aplastic anemia in the general pediatric population is roughly 
one in a million.
4 The incidence of aplastic anemia in children after chloramphenicol 
exposure is roughly one in ten thousand.
5 If the populations studied are large enough, 
these two frequencies can be shown to be statistically significantly different using 
straightforward statistical methods. Within large populations, there is, without question, 
an increase in the absolute risk of aplastic anemia after chloramphenicol exposure.  
Next, consider a hypothetical individual child with aplastic anemia who had been 
exposed to chloramphenicol. Was the chloramphenicol more likely than not to have 
caused this particular child’s aplastic anemia? In order to move from a statistically 
significant increase in aplastic anemia for the general population to more probable than 
                                                 
4 Aplastic Anemia. Sameer Bakhshi, MD, Roy Baynes, MB, BCh, PhD, FACP, Esteban Abella, MD, 
http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic162.htm referenced Sept. 12, 2007 6 
not for an individual case, we need to assess not just the absolute risk increase, but also 
the relative risk increase in that case-- i.e., how large is the chloramphenicol effect, 
compared to the background incidence of aplastic anemia.  
That calculation goes like this. We begin by assessing the incidence of aplastic 
anemia in a group of children who were exposed to chloramphenicol. Next, we compare 
this incidence to the incidence of aplastic anemia in a group of children who did not 
receive chloramphenicol, controlling for potential confounders. Suppose a million 
children were treated with chloramphenicol—we would expect to see 100 cases of 
aplastic anemia due to chloramphenicol (1,000,0000 children exposed * 1 case/10,000 
children exposed). There would also be one child who would have gotten aplastic anemia 
without chloramphenicol (1,000,000 children * 1 case/1,0000,000 children unexposed). 
The likelihood then for any individual child that the aplastic anemia was due to 
chloramphenicol exposure would be 100/101 = 99%—much more probably true than not. 
 
IV. Omission, Commission, Contribution, and Cause 
 
Intuitively, the analysis of commission is different from the analysis of omission. 
The former seems straightforward—if a doctor cuts a blood vessel and it bleeds, then she 
caused the bleeding. If she gave a medicine and the patient had an allergic reaction, then 
she caused the reaction. This type of direct causation seems unambiguous.  
In contrast, what if a doctor did not give an antibiotic, and the patient went on to 
suffer from an infection? If she did not do a brain scan, and the patient went on to die of a 
brain tumor? If she did not give a pregnant woman antenatal corticosteroids (ACS) and 
her prematurely born baby went on to have respiratory distress syndrome (RDS)? Did her 
omission "cause" the subsequent illness? The obvious question is "how likely is the result 
to have happened, anyway"? Many premature babies would get RDS even if their mother 
had received ACS. The distinction between errors of omission and commission seems 
self-evident. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, however, the statistical analyses of errors of omission 
and errors of commission are essentially identical. The only difference between omission 
and commission lies in the frequency of the injury in the absence of the presumed 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Merck manual medical library; http://www.merck.com/mmpe/sec14/ch170/ch170d.html, accessed Sept. 
12, 2007 7 
“cause”—what is sometimes called the “background rate.” For many errors of 
commission (like bleeding after cutting an artery), the background rate (spontaneous 
bleeding of the artery) is virtually zero. Consequently, the frequency of arterial bleeding 
in the exposed groups (those who were operated on) is nearly identical to the frequency 
in overall population, and the relative risk of bleeding after exposure is ~100%—if you 
had arterial bleeding after an operation, it almost certainly came from the surgery.  
 However, there are other examples of commission where the background rate is 
far from zero. Consider the administration of VIOXX, an anti-inflammatory agent that 
has been associated with increased risk of heart attacks in adults. At a minimum, we can 
be sure that the background rate of heart attacks in some populations of non-VIOXX 
exposed adults is much higher than the rate of spontaneous arterial bleeding in people 
without surgery. 
Similarly, for many errors of omission (like failure to give ACS in premature 
infants) the frequency of injury (RDS), even in the treated population, is far from zero (it 
is 28% in our example, compared to 40% in untreated infants). ACS certainly reduces the 
risk of RDS in absolute terms within large populations, but the relative risk reduction for 
particular infants is only (40% - 28%)/40% = 30%. Consequently, claims that, to a 51% 
degree of certainty (more probably true than not), failure to provide ACS “caused” RDS 
in an individual baby are difficult to support. Once again, counter-examples exist. The 
incidence of Hemophilus meningitis after Hemophilus vaccine is close to zero, and 
consequently the relative risk reduction of Hemophilus vaccine approaches 100%. 
These statistical distinctions find resonance in the lay terms “caused” and 
“contributed.” When the background rate of injury is very small (e.g., the miniscule rate 
of spontaneous arterial bleeding) then there is nothing “contributed” by other causes, and 
the entire observed rate of injury is “caused” by the intervention. But for a phenomenon 
where the frequency of injury is still substantial despite medical intervention (like RDS 
after ACS), the relative contribution of the behavior in question falls as the contribution 
of other causes rises. In all cases, omissions and commissions are amenable to the same 
statistical analysis. 
 
V. On System Design and Individual Causation 
 
The analysis thus far demonstrates that plaintiffs may not be able to show 8 
causation, in the relevant sense, even though the general behavior in question produced a 
significant increase in the statistical risk across large populations. From the systemic 
perspective, there is a large issue in the background. Suppose that the legal system is 
concerned with general deterrence—that it seeks to produce optimal behavior on the part 
of actors (doctors in the contexts on which we have focused here). If prospective actors 
are attentive to the signals given by the legal system, behavior might well be altered, to 
the appropriate degree, even though causation in the relevant legal sense cannot be shown 
in individual cases—if and because such behavior increases the general welfare of the 
population.  
Recall the ACS case with which we began. It is clear that from the standpoint of 
system design, doctors should be giving ACS to pregnant women in the relevant 
circumstances. Even if plaintiffs cannot prove causation in individual cases (because the 
injury is not more probably than not a product of the defendant’s action), there is no 
doubt that across large populations, the failure to administer ACS creates a statistically 
significant increase in risk of morbidity for prematurely born infants. A sensible 
administrative agency would want doctors to give ACS to pregnant women in these 
situations. Perhaps courts, concerned with giving the right deterrent signal, should do the 
same thing. 
From the standpoint of optimal deterrence, it might therefore be possible to 
defend a decision to relax the standard causation requirements in the interest of 
promoting socially desirable behavior. But there are two problems with any such defense. 
The first is that the tort system is often understood in terms of corrective justice, and the 
“more likely than not” standard seems to depend on judgments about what corrective 
justice requires. But administrative agencies are not fundamentally concerned with 
corrective justice, and it would be possible to argue that courts, alert to the problems we 
have discussed, should shift from corrective justice to optimal deterrence as well.  
The second problem with a relaxed causation standard, involving risk-risk 
tradeoffs, is more complicated. Imagine an intervention (say, caesarian section as 
opposed to vaginal delivery at 24 weeks gestation) in which the evidence showed that the 
risk of bleeding in the baby's brain was reduced by 3% using C/Section—but 
simultaneously the overall the risks of post-operative complications (bleeding, infection, 
clots) for the mother were increased by 30% after C/Section compared to vaginal 9 
delivery. And now imagine that a baby is born vaginally (because the obstetrician 
balanced those two risks and decided against the caesarian operation), and further 
imagine that the baby developed bleeding in the brain (but, of course, the mother did not 
develop any of the complications of the C/section that she did not have). How are courts 
or administrative agencies supposed to balance those comparisons? It is clear that as the 
relative risk reduction of any intervention approaches 1.0 (no beneficial impact at all), the 
countervailing concerns about side-effects are likely to become more important. 
The problem of risk-risk tradeoffs suggests that a defendant should not be found 
liable in cases in which the act in question reduced risks on balance—even if an adverse 
side-effect came to fruition. Of course this is a claim about the standard of care, not about 
causation. In easy cases, behavior that produced a small, population-wide increase in one 
risk should not be found negligent if the increase was necessary to produce a larger, 
population-wide decrease in another risk. Our claim, then, is that even if it is possible to 
defend a relaxed conception of causation in the circumstances we are discussing, any 
such relaxation must take place in a context in which courts pay attention to the full set of 
risks, and do not impose liability when doctors (or other defendants) reduced risks on 
balance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To establish causation in tort cases, plaintiffs must show that it is more probable 
than not that the behavior in question caused their injury. A significant absolute risk 
reduction across a large population does not necessarily establish causation in a tort case. 
This point holds for both acts and omissions, and it extends across a wide array of actual 
and imaginable problems. In malpractice cases in particular, what is necessary is an 
assessment of the risk reduction to the particular plaintiff, not across a large population. 
A statistically significant decrease in population-wide risk is not inconsistent with the 
conclusion that the tortuous behavior was not likely to have caused injury in any 
individual plaintiff.   
For the most part, our analysis has focused on application of standard principles 
of causation. We have also suggested, however, that if optimal deterrence is the goal, use 
of the standard principles may be misconceived in cases in which an intervention may 
produce a significant decrease in risks across large populations. But if courts are tempted 10 
to relax standard causation requirements on the grounds that we have sketched, they 
should do so knowingly and explicitly, and with careful attention to the possibility of 
risk-risk tradeoffs. 
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